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INTRODUCTION 
A Framework for Transitional Grantmaking 
When a war draws to a close or an authoritarian regime falls, the world stops to take note. These 
are moments of ‘history in the making’. After years of protracted conflict or repressive rule, new 
horizons for profound reformulation of the social contract can unexpectedly arise. While experi-
ences in places ranging from Somalia to Iraq to Afghanistan may give grounds for caution about 
the path a transition can take, scores of other cases demonstrate that these historical moments 
are above all an invitation to act. This publication offers a tailored framework for private founda-
tions to do so, drawing directly on the experience and ideas of the sector itself. The framework is 
premised on the evident fact that the strategic considerations a donor faces in such contexts are 
fundamentally different from those faced in contexts of ongoing conflict or dictatorship, or of 
mature and stable democracies.  
Two possible frameworks could guide engagement in societies transitioning out of armed conflict 
or repression. At one extreme, a radical change in the external context could lead a foundation to 
adopt a correspondingly radical risk-taking or ‘seize-the-day’ approach, prompting it to leap into 
action based on mistaken assumptions about the end results desired by citizens of the transitioning 
country. At the opposite extreme, a ‘stay-the-course’ framework could be adopted. A foundation 
already engaged in the country might prefer to maintain the same partners and activities, knowing 
the old actors better than the new. A foundation not engaged in the country could stay the course 
by simply staying out, on account of discomfort with an unfamiliar and rapidly-shifting political 
environment.  
A better framework rejects both these extremes, offering a middle course that is logical in light of 
the unique opportunity for impact a transition creates and responsible in the context of the many 
unknowns about its destination. That framework, presented here, is one of ‘informed risk-taking’. 
It combines two basic elements: an understanding by the donor that heightened risk is the accept-
able corollary of enhanced opportunity for impact; and a matching commitment to expand due 
diligence in relation to the country in question. 
The logic of informed risk-taking is advisable for any committed philanthropist or institutional donor, 
not only for private foundations, but is especially relevant for the latter. First, private foundations 
have greater independence and flexibility with their funds compared to governments and other 
publically accountable bodies, and thus a greater inherent capacity to take risks. Secondly, they 
can respond to opportunities more quickly than large bilateral and multilateral donors that work 
within elaborate regulatory structures. Thirdly, due to their smaller scale of financial resources, 
foundations have a greater self-interest to be creative and catalytic in their funding priorities. In 
transitional settings that are often crowded with other actors, they have every reason to leverage 
their comparative advantages. 
This guide contains three main sections. The first section offers an overview and conceptual frame 
for understanding contemporary national transitions that face familiar challenges but also new 
global complications. As used here, the term ‘transition’ refers to the opening created by the for-
mal end of an authoritarian regime or armed conflict in which new possibilities for transformative 
political, economic and socio-cultural change become possible. The focus is particularly on the ear-
liest period of such a transition, when events unfold most quickly, and multiple paths are open to 
achieve important structural advances in democratic participation, economic reform, rule of law 
and human security. 
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The second section explores the comparative advantages and limitations of private foundations in 
relation to the larger aid sector operating in transitional contexts. Lessons learned from private 
foundations involved over many years in cross-border grantmaking receive special attention. 
Because local philanthropy also plays an important role during transitions – and helps sustain sup-
port over the long run – consideration is given to how international and local foundations can 
work effectively together in transitional environments. 
The third section presents informed risk-taking as a logical and practical framework to help foun-
dations achieve disproportionate positive outcomes through the programmes they undertake in 
particular transitions. Drawing on the sector’s collective wisdom following decades of global 
experience in transitional settings, as well as aspects of the broader aid industry experience, it 
gives actionable guidance on the strategic questions and considerations that can help foundations 
to put the principle of informed risk-taking into practice.  
The aggregate impact of the foundation sector’s efforts to assist societies in transition is not well 
documented. Even anecdotally, though, it demonstrates the unique and deeply important role 
foundations can and should play. The aim of this guide is to help them do so with maximum co-
herence and effect at a time of strategic reflection in the sector. It shows the way for foundations 
to achieve disproportionate impact with their investments when, often abruptly, wars end or dic-
tatorships fall and the possibilities of a brighter future suddenly grow real. 
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Section I: Challenges and Opportunities  
of Contemporary Transition 
What is underway now is a sort of delayed footnote to the ‘third wave’ of democratisation that the 
world witnessed prior to and at the end of the Cold War – a wave that started in Southern Europe, 
then went to Latin America, then to Eastern Europe and then to some Asian and African countries, 
but that to a large extent bypassed the Arab world. Now we are entering an Arab chapter that,  
delayed by 20 years, had not been opened with the others or with the same movement. – Interview 
with transition expert 
The backstory 
Between 1974 and 1990, more than 30 countries in Europe and South America entered transitions 
out of authoritarian rule, in what political scientist Samuel Huntington described as the third wave 
of democratisation. In the 1990s, other instances of post-authoritarian transition arose in a number 
of places, ranging from Haiti to Ghana to Thailand. Along the way, the study of political transitions 
became a field in its own right, as scholars tried to identify the key pathways of democratic con-
solidation following regime shifts.  
Civil wars raged in a number of parts of the world during the same decades. Some, including those in 
Central America and Southern Africa, arose and worsened during – and often on account of – the 
Cold War. Others intensified in the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, such as in 
the former Yugoslavia, West Africa and Central Africa, where dictatorships often overlapped with 
civil wars. In many cases the conflicts were formally concluded through negotiated agreements or 
peace accords. In time, experts coined terms such as ‘post-conflict transition’, ‘peace-making’ and 
‘peace-building’, as the international community mounted systematic efforts to prevent future 
bloodshed. 
Yet, by the early 2000s, strong doubts emerged about the idea of transitional pathways – whether 
post-authoritarian or post-conflict – as the consolidation of democracy and peace frequently failed 
or stalled, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2001, democracy expert Tom Carothers famously 
criticised a then-prevalent ‘transition paradigm’ that was based on a range of faulty assumptions 
(e.g., that countries moving away from dictatorship are necessarily transitioning toward democracy; 
that elections necessarily lead to a deepening of democracy; and that the underlying structural 
conditions in transitional countries are minor factors compared to political will). New terms such 
as ‘failed states’ and ‘fragile states’ soon emerged, reflecting a growing realism about the difficult 
terrain in which many transitions arise and the unfulfilled promises they can leave behind.  
Of course, the balance sheet of the last 40 years has not been entirely negative. There have been 
numerous important cases of post-authoritarian transition (e.g., Spain, Chile, Ghana, South Africa, 
Indonesia, the Baltic states and Poland) and post-conflict transition (e.g., Mozambique, Croatia, 
Northern Ireland and Liberia) in which the likelihood of a return to tyranny or war has receded. 
Globally, fewer dictatorships and civil wars exist – arguably a sign of progress in democratisation 
and international peace-building efforts.  
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Yet, the tumultuous transitions underway in the Arab region serve as a reminder of at least three 
things:  
• The continuing currency of the term and concept of transition that societies continue  
to apply to themselves even as they lurch in and out of crisis; 
• The deeply-contested nature of nearly all facets of a transition out of war or 
repressive rule; and  
• The common set of problems faced by post-conflict and post-authoritarian societies  
alike during the early years of a transition. 
Common challenges 
The typical challenges of transitional contexts, described below, manifest themselves in very dif-
ferent ways among societies, but the differences tend to be of degree rather than kind. 
Conflicting goals: Transitions require an elevated ability to balance short-term crisis management 
with long-term planning. By their nature, they are not static moments in which leaders can plan 
and act in relative calm. Yet, because a transitional government will expect its citizens to defer 
urgent needs while the process of change gradually unfolds, the articulation of a long-term vision – 
an ultimate destination – is crucial. Groups with different ideologies or identities may nevertheless 
find it difficult to produce a shared national vision.  
The power of the past: The formal demise of a regime can open new possibilities for transforma-
tion but also reactivate old mind-sets and conflicts. The roots of a country’s past problems will 
often display themselves in new and dangerous ways, including sectarian splits in the electoral 
arena or counterproductive show trials. Nostalgia for a romanticised past – when there was more 
order or more household income – may grow and spur the rise of populist or authoritarian leaders 
who politicise sub-national identities. 
Leadership gaps and spoilers: Even a well-intentioned new political class will often lack the basic 
skills of modern governance required to guide a transition. The leader of the country might be a 
former schoolteacher who has lived abroad for the last twenty years, and the finance minister a 
recent law school graduate. Such circumstances are ripe for exploitation by potential spoilers – 
whether security services, disgruntled old guard or regional actors. The risks are compounded by 
weak parliaments, in which embryonic political parties operate without prior experience and basic 
skills in coalition-building.  
Dysfunctional public institutions: Times of transition frequently reveal that central institutions of 
the state are either non-existent or thoroughly corrupted. The civil service, often bloated and un-
professional, may hold the power to undermine new state actors if its interests are not addressed. 
The justice system typically lacks the public’s trust. Police and other security forces may remain 
under the de facto direction of the military or some predatory element of politics. In the absence 
of functioning institutions, organised or petty crime networks or more ad hoc forms of terror or 
political violence can grow.  
Weak non-state sectors: Local civil society organisations often play a key role in overturning dicta-
tors or ushering in peace, but the transitional period that follows may expose variable capacity to 
shape a new social and political agenda. Similarly, the media’s limited ability to evolve into an in-
dependent and effective fourth estate may become apparent. The private sector may lean heavily 
toward previously-favoured cronies who lack the capacity to operate profitably in an open global 
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economy. Other businesses may leave the country, taking with them expertise and capital at a time 
when budget deficits are widening, and governments are compelled to reduce public spending.  
The international avalanche: Since the end of the Cold War, international financial and technical 
assistance actors – aid agencies, multilateral bodies and international non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) – have become a significant factor in almost every attempted transition. They typi-
cally arrive en masse, offering far-reaching expertise and support, but with limited coordination or 
agreed standards. The international flurry of activity often outstrips local absorption capacity and 
peaks early, moving out when new crises or more attractive opportunities arise elsewhere. Con-
fusion and frustration increase among local actors, in some cases provoking a counter-reaction of 
greater restrictions on those who remain in the country.  
The upside 
Actors engaged in transitions must actively anticipate and address these challenges. None can be 
ignored. At the same time, it would be illogical to allow them to divert attention from what is, at 
core, a critical and time-sensitive opening for a country to break with the primary causes of past 
disorder and chart a new and better path forward.  
Transitions should be viewed primarily as invitations to action. They are the critical junctures of 
history when, rather than moving by steps, a society can potentially spring forward and redefine 
itself for the better. As Rachel Kleinfeld writes, “while time unfolds at the same rate of sixty sec-
onds every minute, in politics and society there are punctuations, windows of opportunity in 
which sixty seconds can be worth far more than the same amount of time a few months down the 
road”. This is the essence of a transitional moment. It is structurally and politically distinct from 
periods characterised either by stagnation (e.g., contexts of entrenched dictatorship) or degenera-
tion (e.g., contexts of escalating armed conflict). While its end-point may be debatable, its starting 
point is rarely in doubt. 
The first few years of a transition are typically the most important, as the window for reform is at 
its widest. While the consolidation of democracy, development, the rule of law and security is a 
long-term process, reform in these initial years can set a transition on a positive track. The euphoria 
that often greets transitions can subside quickly and turn to disenchantment when high expectations 
for rapid change are not met, but early and visible benefits can help to create and maintain a sense of 
hope and optimism. In the best of cases, the early months and years can create a stronger social 
compact, both between the state and the citizens and among the main groups within the society. It 
is above all in this sense that transitions present the possibility to achieve disproportionate positive 
outcomes.  
Evolving trends 
What is in my mind so special about transitions in the Middle East and North Africa is the extreme 
polarisation of discourse, the extreme fluidity of legitimacy and the extreme generational divide 
along a hope-despair spectrum. Information flows are faster than ever before, and visual informa-
tion is much more easily shared. Many of the grand narratives of economic and political develop-
ment have been discredited, and no new grand narrative has emerged to take its place, leaving 
space for new approaches. – Interview with foundation director 
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Changes in the global political landscape since the end of the Cold War have added new layers of 
challenge and opportunity for successful transition. The most commented aspect is the revolution 
in communication technologies. Transitions today are accelerated by 24/7 news cycles, the imme-
diacy of social media and crowd-sourcing of real-time video. Constitutions are less likely to be 
drafted over months or years behind closed doors, while controversial trials are often broadcast 
live to the public. This speeding up of information brings with it a heightened demand for broad 
participation. Yet, the luxury of time and insulation that enabled leaders to form new skill sets, 
build viable coalitions, and achieve consensus around the new order no longer exists. Privacy, too, 
is under greater threat, since new technologies can become a tool for illegal surveillance or other 
mischief.  
Current transitions also have the misfortune of occurring in the midst of a major economic slow-
down in the Western world. Arab countries receive far less support than did earlier transitions in 
Southern Africa or Eastern Europe, though wealthy regional monarchies such as Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia are, with limited transparency, filling some of the gap. The Western world is also suffering a 
growing legitimacy crisis in Muslim-majority and post-colonial countries long suspicious of a mis-
sion civilisatrice. This in turn has complicated the acceptance of new international policy norms 
(e.g., Responsibility to Protect) and institutions (e.g., the International Criminal Court) that, with 
increased transnational threats (e.g., climate change, nuclear proliferation and terrorism), form 
part of the contemporary global environment for countries emerging out of war or repressive rule.  
Nevertheless, many of the challenges in places such as Burma, Tunisia and the Ivory Coast are 
familiar to a scholar of past waves of transition. Common patterns, syndromes and policy tensions 
can be observed across profoundly different political, economic and socio-cultural contexts. At the 
same time, it is evident that transitions remain domestic affairs defined, above all, by national, 
as well as sub-national, realities. Simply put, transitions stand a better chance of success when 
informed by experience but addressed through the prism of existing local norms and structures, 
however fragile or inchoate, rather than purportedly universal norms and best practices.  
Also noteworthy is a growing recognition of the importance of political, economic and socio-
cultural ‘inclusiveness’ as an overarching priority in transitions. When it is on the agenda, it can 
give stability and direction to an otherwise unpredictable process. When it is absent, everything 
risks falling apart, as in Egypt where exclusionary politics have undermined the opening created 
through a broadly-based popular revolt. As will be shown, an inclusiveness agenda item may offer 
one of the most effective ways for foundations to pursue and achieve disproportionate positive 
outcomes that would be unattainable in more ordinary periods.  
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A word on disproportionate outcomes 
The concept of disproportionate outcomes is 
not restricted to transitional settings. It could 
be an apt term to use, for example, to describe 
a humanitarian grantmaking response after a 
natural disaster: absent the response, millions 
of lives could be at risk. However, the dispro-
portionate outcome opportunity in a transition 
is distinct: it relates to the opportunity for 
transformative political, economic and social 
reform, and it stems from a positive change in 
context. Consider the following analogy.  
The election of a new administration in the U.S. 
is seen as a window of opportunity by the vic-
torious party’s political and financial backers. 
Supporters ‘switch the chip’ when their side is 
elected to power: they shift from opposition 
and advocacy to proposition and reform. 
Transitions out of authoritarian rule and armed 
conflict are similar, yet hold greater promise. 
Whereas in the above example the change in 
approach is driven by, and conditioned on, a 
fixed electoral cycle, in the case of a transition 
from dictatorship or war the scope for poten-
tial change is exponentially higher. The window 
of opportunity is not merely for reform within a 
generally fixed and stable system, but for re-
form of the entire system and of the social con-
tract with, and between, citizens. If it is logical 
for foundations to re-orient some giving in the 
context of a changed administration following 
an important election, then it is doubly so in 
the context of a transition out of armed conflict 
or repression.  
As will be shown, though, precisely because 
more is at stake in such a transition, the re-
quired degree of prudence is higher. Since a 
whole order is being overturned, potentially 
forever, those who stand to lose the most will 
likely be more active and destructive than they 
might be in relation to a lost election within a 
system based on rules they generally accept – 
as was seen, for example, with the tragic  
escalation of violence in Iraq triggered by the 
De-Baathification policy following the 2003 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein.  
Compared to the change of an administration 
within a stable democratic system, the conse-
quence of getting things wrong in a post-
authoritarian or post-conflict transition may 
also be greater: early errors can produce hard-
to-change frameworks and systems that facili-
tate a continuous stream of bad policy. And 
yet, the risks that accompany transitions are 
simply the flipside of the disproportionate im-
pact opportunities they present. In transitions, 
risk and reward go hand in hand.
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Section 2: Roles and Strengths of  
the Foundation Sector 
Private philanthropy, defined as the mobilisation of private assets for the public good, is in the 
midst of a fertile period of expansion around the world. After many decades in which the range of 
foundation-giving models was relatively unchanged, the last 15 years have seen a proliferation of 
new and hybrid types. Business and investment principles inform venture philanthropy, while 
community-based foundations increasingly devolve decision-making power to citizens. Some kinds 
of social investing allow for expectations of a recycling of capital rather than spending out through 
grants. In addition, as philanthropy becomes more global, large foundations now collate funds 
from thousands of donors to support causes like environmental protection or women’s empower-
ment (e.g., Global Greengrants Fund and Mama Cash). Meanwhile, Kiva, Global Giving and others 
enable individual donors to support causes far from their home communities through internet-
based solicitation and distribution channels. The basic framework elaborated in this guide may 
provide useful suggestions for any private donor interested in making a contribution to support 
transitions.  
The specific focus taken here, though, is on internationally-active private foundations whose pri-
mary operating model is grantmaking to other groups or individuals in order to address structural 
issues, build stronger institutions or drive socio-developmental goals. Grantmaking foundations 
take a variety of forms, with assets possibly drawn from an individual, a family, a corporation or an 
aggregate of donors. They may channel their support through service sectors like health or educa-
tion, assist disadvantaged groups such as refugees or prisoners or promote social ‘goods’ such as 
human rights, culture or rule of law. Beyond grantmaking, their support may also take the form 
of knowledge transfer, network-building and convening. The range of foundation models and 
activities is ever-growing.  
The value of grantmaking  
 If you pick the right countries, you can have the most astonishing impact even with £10,000.  
You can go into the same place at a different time and have a completely different result. But sadly, 
not enough grantmakers are transfixed by these moments – these times in a country’s history when 
everything speeds up, when there are opportunities for grantmaking to help breathe new oxygen 
into a society. This is the real joy of doing the work of a grantmaker. – Interview with  
foundation leader 
Catalytic philanthropy, in which foundations proactively set out to design the solutions to an intrac-
table social problem, has gained in popularity. It has also sparked counter-arguments in support of 
the more traditional model of giving that is designed to serve needs identified beyond foundation 
boardrooms. While both have their place in the philanthropic landscape, a strong case can be 
made for grantmaking in support of social change in a transition setting, with heightened needs 
for both local knowledge and capacity-building.  
Grantmaking involves a transfer of funds to unrelated entities, usually in response to an applica-
tion or programme proposal. Ideally, this establishes a dialectic where the grantee proposes ideas 
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and activities to advance its mission, and the foundation responds with funding where an overlap 
in mission is identified. Some of the most innovative ideas regarding how foundation funds should 
be spent emerge outside of the institution, especially in times of great change. In transitional settings 
where an intense national dynamic is driving events that were largely unpredicted, a grantmaker’s 
ability and willingness to be responsive to local needs is particularly welcome. 
Foundation grantmaking may take a number of forms: core funding for an organisation’s basic 
expenses; project-specific grants (both cash and in-kind); or leveraged arrangements in which a 
grantee is challenged to raise additional funds by a matching opportunity. Grantmaking also varies 
along a temporal continuum, from short-term seed funding to new entities to establish ‘proof of 
concept’ and encourage other donors to step in, to medium-term project-implementation grants. 
At the far end of the continuum are grants with a five-to-ten-year horizon that incorporate ele-
ments of internal institutional capacity development. Grant sizes similarly range from small study 
or travel awards to investments of hundreds of thousands or, in some cases, millions of dollars 
over time.  
In any of these forms, foundation grants hold the potential to impact the success of transitions in 
significant ways. Many foundations rightly take pride in having nurtured an opposition group that 
later produces the first post-revolutionary president, a think tank that generates the ideas that 
shape a future human rights policy or a mediated dialogue process that facilitates a vital compro-
mise among political antagonists. While other activities foundations undertake, such as in-house 
research or external advocacy, can also be important in supporting such transitional outcomes, 
they cannot replace the core value and business of grantmaking. 
Foundation platforms 
Over the past decades, private foundations operating internationally have employed a variety of 
delivery platforms to carry out their transition-related philanthropy, with the specific choices vary-
ing by context. These include devolving grantmaking to an intermediary, hiring a local represen-
tative or establishing an in-country office. Foundations may even promote entirely new granting 
entities: Open Society Foundations’ network model seeds the formation of national foundation 
affiliates based on recruiting local actors to governing boards and staff in transitional countries. 
These affiliates receive initial funding and technical support from the global network. Other inter-
national foundations have successfully promoted formation of localised community foundations in 
transitional settings in sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern and Central Europe where they did not pre-
viously exist. These community foundations often receive initial help from global support organisa-
tions, but adapt their operations to local conditions and norms.  
A small but growing international infrastructure also exists to support foundation grantmaking 
efforts. This includes university-based philanthropy research centres (e.g., in Cairo, Beijing, and 
Indonesia), social investment incubators and regional or thematic membership-based networks. 
Such groups typically do not make grants, but they can take on important roles in transitions – for 
example, by providing a neutral convening platform for donors in an otherwise polarised setting or 
assistance in the gathering and transmission of timely information within and beyond transition 
settings. In addition, philanthropy infrastructure organisations can facilitate networking, advise 
new donors, provide peer learning and foster inter-foundation collaboration in areas of shared 
interest. Increasingly they are also sources of technical support for monitoring and evaluating 
grant portfolios and reflecting upon the ultimate societal impact of foundation programmes.  
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Crossing borders 
We need to end the idea of the distinction between local and international. Our Trust, which is 
based in Africa and works in 18 countries, would still be seen as a local in the current way of 
thinking. This must end. What we really need are networks of interest across the local-international 
divide. – Roundtable comment 
The relationship between ‘foreign’ and ‘local’ foundations – all equally diverse in the size, focus, 
and structure of their operations – is an important consideration in transitional contexts. It is first 
worth asking, though, what makes a foundation fall within one of these categories. In general, a 
foundation is considered local when the sources of its assets and governance are indigenous to the 
country in question. A European foundation with a 50-year presence in an Asian country may have 
extraordinary local knowledge and contacts, but it will not tend to be considered local if its assets 
and locus of governance are external. 
Local foundations may be registered as corporations, non-profits, trusts or, alternatively, take sui 
generis forms such as religious endowments (e.g., Islamic awqaf) or community funds (e.g., in 
rural Africa). As part of the recent movement toward hybrid philanthropic forms, some foundation 
structures are now truly a mix of local and international, with both dimensions present in their 
governance and sourcing of funds. These models have grown out of extensive experience in 
determining the optimal mix of externally-directed assistance and encouragement of local donor 
capacity over a long time horizon. 
In their more standard forms, cross-border and local donors have much to offer each other: the 
former when they have important prior transition experience and the latter when they can 
shorten the learning curve for newly-arriving donors. Local foundations enter a transition moment 
with more in-depth knowledge of the country, which can be critical to making nuanced decisions 
about grant support in a shifting or unfamiliar environment. As will be shown, because of their 
permanent tenure, local foundations also have a key role to play in sustaining important pro-
grammes when foreign donors exit several years after the onset of the transition.  
A strategic niche 
Private foundations have the advantage of not having to answer to anyone but themselves.  
As a government agency, we have a huge responsibility to the taxpayer, and we have to account  
in detail for all the money we spend. – Interview with aid agency leader 
Foundations, as well as many theme-based global funds, possess more independence and flexibil-
ity than donors such as bilateral agencies, private corporations and multilateral agencies. This 
takes on special relevance during national transitions. 
Private foundations with a perpetual endowment and independent board typically have the great-
est flexibility of response when transitions take place. Other foundation forms, while important, 
often have additional constituencies involved in decision-making and thus potentially less flexibil-
ity. This is the case, for example, with corporate or bank foundations, governmental foundations 
or political party foundations, though some of these operate with considerable agility. Social invest-
ment organisations, such as venture philanthropy foundations, may fall in between: they face the 
task of identifying local entrepreneurs and matching them with investors who are willing to risk 
their capital in unpredictable settings.  
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While bilateral and multilateral aid agencies often operate on fixed, multi-year budget cycles, private 
philanthropy can be more nimble. Whereas the former may require legally-complex consultations 
with public officials or parliaments, the latter needs only simple approval from its board of direc-
tors to engage in a transition. For private foundations, polling numbers and the requirements of 
periodic elections are not looming influences on decision-making. This relative freedom of action is 
matched by a unique ability to change course in response to new developments once program-
ming begins. Foundations also have comparatively greater leeway to support non-established, 
emerging or informal groups, at the forefront of change, whereas aid agencies may be restricted 
to making grants only to established groups that pass through rigorous auditing procedures.  
The flexibility enjoyed by private philanthropy also extends to staffing. Foundations can recruit 
personnel in unfettered competitions in which nationality, rank or other considerations do not apply. 
Programme personnel at foundations typically enjoy longer tenure than their counterparts in pub-
lic donor agencies, allowing them to develop more in-depth thematic and country expertise. These 
sectoral advantages give private foundations special impetus to take up the disproportionate im-
pact opportunities presented by transitions.  
Scale and acupuncture 
Bilateral money is channelled through governments since they do not want to undermine sovereign 
states. Philanthropic capital is not. It is precious because it is genuine risk capital. Politicians are 
scared by the press. Philanthropic money is not accountable in the same way, and so it can make 
large bets. – Interview with foundation leader 
Although exact data on the comparative percentage of private versus public grantmaking in transi-
tions is unavailable, most public agencies have far larger financial resources than foundations to 
invest in transition programming. This is so even as overseas development assistance, today 
approximately $100 billion per annum globally, is in general decline.  
Yet, operating at a smaller scale does not necessarily imply having smaller impact. Almost three 
years into Egypt’s transition, government reserves are dangerously low and require massive infu-
sions of cash. These are being provided by some Gulf States and even through internal transfers 
from the Egyptian armed forces. By contrast, within the civil society sector, many worthy initia-
tives are struggling to find small amounts of start-up funding. Local charitable giving is directed 
largely to humanitarian causes; few are willing to support social enterprise start-ups or make 
grants to transitional justice projects or fledgling community groups. When the Ford Foundation 
responded in 2011 with a special appropriation for Egypt, important local initiatives for youth 
leadership and civic education, independent media and gender projects were jump-started. Some 
of the large multilateral agreements in these fields have yet to be fully implemented.  
This kind of advantage invites a comparison with acupuncture, which has sometimes been used as 
an analogy to describe private philanthropy’s role. Identifying a suitable site and applying just the 
right pressure is the skill an acupuncturist brings to the art of healing. Foundations may do the same 
in transitions. Well-planned portfolios of grants to a targeted and vetted set of organisations, 
while modest in size compared to World Bank or European Union investments, can set in motion 
vital processes. Even small sums, if well-applied, can have system-wide outcomes that may strongly 
contribute to the success of a transition.  
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Challenges of practice 
Years ago you could directly fund organisations in many countries around the world in transitions, 
and it would be completely accepted, but now Western money is more tainted. I don’t know what 
the equivalent would be, but if Iran, for example, started funding the Canadian NGOs dealing with 
domestic issues, that would cause eyebrows to be raised in Canada. So the legitimacy and authority 
of the model we bring as foundations to these societies is no longer unquestioned and unchallenged; 
there are other frameworks which are often much more attractive. That is a big challenge in a 
multi-polar world with conflicting values. – Interview with foundation trustee 
This guide makes the case for internationally-active grantmaking foundations to deepen their 
engagement in transitional contexts. Yet, doing so also requires an examination of challenges 
undeniably faced by the sector.  
First, the complex history of relations between Western and non-Western societies can impact a 
foundation’s engagement. Recent uprisings in the Arab region have exposed deep rifts among 
groups with competing visions of the end-goal of the transition. Some political movements are 
hyper-nationalistic, while others use religious discourse to achieve legitimacy – and both may be 
prepared to undermine Western ideas and actors along the way. Such groups rarely represent the 
majority of actors engaged in building the new order, but they can effectively utilise media and 
generalised anxieties to create suspicion. To manoeuvre in such a climate, a foundation requires 
strong local partnerships and sensitive ears to the ground.  
Secondly, foundations can feel overwhelmed by the sheer size and complexity of the challenges 
and priorities of a country in transition out of war or dictatorship. The wide gap between the scale 
of the problems facing a transitioning country and the amount of available resources can create a 
sense of disempowerment. From the start, therefore, foundations must decide whether they have 
sufficient commitment and resources to make involvement worthwhile and, likewise, whether as 
donors they are prepared to accept occasional failure as an inevitable part of pursuing extraordi-
nary impact opportunities.  
Thirdly, for cross-border grantmakers, the murky and unstable circumstances in which transitions 
proceed can be intimidating, especially the first time. The intense pace of change places new de-
mands on programme monitoring and recalibration, as what seems certain one month may appear 
implausible the next. For a foundation without prior local experience or on-ground staff, gathering 
sufficient accurate information and assuring the continued relevance of proposed activities and 
receptivity of local actors can be difficult and time-consuming.  
Experience shows, however, that all these challenges can be met by acting on private foundations’ 
intrinsic advantages. The flexibility and nimbleness of their operations relative to other donors 
allow them to respond quickly to unexpected events, design creative programmes and switch 
partners and projects when new circumstances dictate. The independence of their structures 
enables foundations to confront legitimacy gaps, partner with local philanthropy and espouse uni-
versal values that go beyond narrowly-defined national or partisan interests. The small scale of 
foundation resources relative to other grantmaking organisations creates an even stronger incen-
tive to be strategic about allocation decisions and leverage the gaps not filled by other donors. The 
comparatively seasoned hands of foundation staff help to ensure greater context analysis, net-
working ability and reliable intermediaries. Transitions, seen in this light, underscore the need for 
active engagement by private foundations. 
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A transition frame for grantmaking 
Private foundations are for the most part well-
aware of the importance of transitions out of 
conflict and dictatorship and of the related 
fields of democratisation and peace-building. 
Many have deliberately worked in countries for 
years or decades to help activists and thought 
leaders end wars and repression and begin 
their own national transitions.  
Yet, the decades-long record of foundation 
successes (and failures) in transitional contexts 
is largely hidden. Few foundations have an ex-
plicit grantmaking department or programme 
category called ‘transitions’. Even fewer evalu-
ate those grants systematically or share grant 
portfolio assessments. Moreover, concepts and 
terms like ‘fragile states’, ‘state-building’,  
‘governance’, ‘democratisation’ and ‘peace-
building’ rarely figure in foundation parlance, 
even when that is a clear operational priority, 
and despite the fact that these are the terms to 
which the transitions literature long ago shifted 
and under which most non-developmental and 
humanitarian aid is channelled.  
Less obviously political terms like ‘social 
change’ and ‘social justice’ are far more preva-
lent in foundation discourse. It is worth asking, 
however, whether more transition-specific 
terminology and programming could help 
foundations identify like-minded donors,  
accumulate learning and give greater focus to 
grantmaking in countries emerging from con-
flict or repression – all without violating chari-
table rules that prohibit involvement with  
political parties or elections and irrespective of 
whether a foundation operates through the-
matic programmes, geographic ones, or both.  
The way forward is partly tied to re-examining 
the common practice of using segregated 
grantmaking categories. If a transition is best 
understood as a critical moment for the recon-
stitution of social contracts that involve over-
lapping political, economic and socio-cultural 
dimensions, then foundation programming 
logically requires a cross-sectoral approach. In a 
transition, getting experimental and breaking 
down artificial or counterproductive divisions 
between fields such as education, health and 
human rights is more than just good practice;  
it is logical.  
The wider aid sector is already moving in this 
direction. For example, the 2011 New Deal for 
Engagement in Fragile States, developed 
through the forum of the International Dia-
logue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, is 
premised on the integration of political, eco-
nomic and socio-cultural policies and could 
serve as a positive example for foundations to 
consider and adapt, according to their own  
sectoral strengths and interests.
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Section 3: Informed Risk-Taking for 
Disproportionate Outcomes 
Having defined transitions and explained the place of foundations in the larger world of cross-
border cooperation, this section outlines the logic of informed risk-taking as a principle to guide 
foundation engagement in transitional contexts. It provides practical tools, analysis and examples 
to assist foundations in making the most of the strategic opening created by transitions. It aims to 
guide foundations in matching their particular comparative advantages with the disproportionate 
opportunity for advancing public goods that a transition offers.  
Although there is no common minimum definition of the public good in the realm of private philan-
thropic grantmaking, licensing bodies and legislation in a foundation’s host country may impose 
some parameters. For purposes of this guide, public good is defined as a focus on assisting societies 
in transition to become more inclusive and states more responsive to local needs, in order to in-
crease the probability of achieving a permanent break with armed conflict or repression. The 
intention is to strengthen the efforts of private foundations that are dedicated to this, while recog-
nising that approaches to advancing such a public good will always need to be tailored to particular 
transitional contexts. 
The meaning of informed risk-taking 
As someone engaged in supporting arts and culture, I felt that we needed to live up to this moment, 
to capture the opportunity and maximise its potential for change. There was tension between my 
desire to do so and the slow pace of the institution I worked for at the time, which opted to take a 
wait-and-see approach to the evolving events. The moment of revolutionary change in the Arab 
world exposed the ability of institutions to deal with the unexpected and, ultimately, be the creative 
institutions they claim to be. Young Arab activists were moving fast, creating their own forums and 
spaces. – Interview with foundation director  
Transitions are exceptional times requiring exceptional measures. For foundations to stay rele-
vant, they need to think and act differently and to take risks. Policies and programmes that made 
sense in times of open conflict or dictatorship are unlikely to maintain the same relevance.  
At the same time, private foundations, like any cause-oriented philanthropists, must be prudent in 
changing tack. Given the serious challenges that accompany societies emerging from conflict and 
authoritarian rule, heightened due diligence is imperative: the call to take greater risk cannot 
mean ignoring the ‘do-no-harm’ principle. Nevertheless, foundations require a more customised 
principle or framework to guide their actions in transitions – one that balances the imperative of 
due diligence with a risk-taking mind-set consistent with the far-reaching but temporary nature of 
transitional opportunities. 
Inevitably, each foundation will have its own threshold for how much information it deems suffi-
cient to justify taking a particular risk, as well as its own process for determining the level and type 
of risk in question (whether financial, legal, political, reputational, or security-related). Also, few 
foundations believe they would ever act in an uninformed or risk-averse fashion, even when evi-
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dence occasionally shows the contrary. The framework of informed risk-taking recognises both 
these realities and simply advocates the following: whatever one’s normal threshold, in a transition 
be prepared to take more risks but assess those risks with greater than usual scrutiny and frequency. 
By using this framework, a foundation prevents itself from failing to act on:  
• the disproportionate outcome opportunity a transition offers;  
• the comparative advantages and added value a foundation has in such contexts; and  
• the due diligence requirements a significantly-altered political environment demands. 
Yet, the informed risk-taking framework implies something more: a willingness to live with a bigger 
chance of failure. Because transitions unfold with a high degree of unpredictability, some social 
investments in a grantmaker’s portfolio may – indeed, are likely - to fail. Stakes are high, systems 
are volatile, and, despite good intentions on both sides of a grant agreement, some projects will 
not achieve their objectives, or worse, will harm the larger transition. Here, the leadership of a 
foundation is needed to steer a course between fear of failure and over-confidence in success, 
knowing that the bets that succeed offer the chance for a depth of impact that may surpass dec-
ades of investments in non-transitional settings.  
Foundations can also mitigate their risk-taking. They can create balanced portfolios of high, me-
dium and low-risk investments. They can increase the frequency of monitoring intervals with 
grantees and maintain a relationship that encourages honest disclosure about unexpected mid-
course developments, matched by a willingness to reprogram funds or allow fresh starts where 
necessary. They can make comparatively smaller grants to actors and projects that carry the big-
gest risks. They can also develop media relationships early in a grant cycle so that, if problems 
arise, informed journalists can be expected to report more fairly.  
Of course, no donor wants to end up with negative press or legal difficulties that put individuals or 
organisations in jeopardy. Transition grantmaking, therefore, calls for increased attention to form-
ing public communication strategies that educate both in-country and headquarter-country audi-
ences, except when a low profile is required; building and maintaining strong local contacts and 
alliances; and staying well-informed about the country’s power shifts and politics. In the home 
country, foundations can also join with donor associations in advocating laws and regulations that 
encourage rather than penalise sound cross-border grant-making in support of transitions. 
Informed risk-taking in action 
Having described the general principle of informed risk-taking, this section offers a practical tem-
plate for implementation. Naturally, each foundation will develop its own approach to implementing 
the principle. This guide aims to improve the focus and form of the exercise.  
The template of informed risk-taking has three sequential parts, structured as questions: 
• Step 1: What is the nature of the change process underway in the transitional context? 
• Step 2: How relevant is our foundation’s mission and operating style to the new context?  
• Step 3: What programmatic considerations arise when the priorities of our foundation 
overlap with the new context? 
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Step 1: What is the nature of the change process underway in the new context? 
Critical lens 
Our job is to try to make a critical difference, in critical places and at critical times. The tools we  
use need to be flexible. In a transition, you need to constantly study the situation to stay relevant. 
Because the fact is that, if you’re no longer relevant, you’re just wasting people’s time. – Interview 
with aid agency leader 
The beginning of a transition begs reappraisal on many fronts, internal as well as external. How-
ever, experience suggests it would be wrong for a foundation to begin its analysis with a focus on its 
own mission, instead of the situation on the ground. External reality must be the analytical start-
ing point in times of transition, since these larger-than-life moments call for skilful and nuanced 
assessments that will vary greatly from place to place.  
Even when a foundation has been active for many years in a particular country, a transition demands 
renewed questioning. Are we in a fundamentally altered political landscape? Does our operating 
premise about the root causes of prior war or dictatorship still hold? Do we know who is rising in 
the new order and who is falling from the old order? What new kinds of risk and opportunity are 
present?  
Reassessing a formerly static situation with a fresh set of eyes is at the heart of the ’informed’ 
component of informed risk-taking. The act of becoming informed is not, however, an exercise in 
dry technical research. It is active and political, in the sense of requiring closer attention than ever 
to the causes and consequences of power shifts. Almost every aspect of public life becomes politi-
cally fluid during transitions, often in unexpected ways. Under the Mubarak regime in Egypt, for 
example, citizen efforts to monitor elections and get out the vote were criminalised. Civic activists 
assumed that, in a post-Mubarak era, these would become unquestioned rights. Yet, under mili-
tary rule in 2012, the same push toward exclusive control was evident, and some Egyptian NGOs 
were accused of attempts to divide the country when authorities confiscated their election-
monitoring maps. 
While prior experience and contacts in a country are usually major advantages in helping assess 
context, they can also become liabilities. To develop a fresh perspective on a country, while man-
aging the adverse impact the new analysis may have on longstanding relationships, is not easy. 
Long-time grantees who risk being replaced by emergent groups can even become obstructive. 
At the same time, a grantmaker that lacks prior contacts or experience on the ground will, in most 
cases, face greater difficulties in developing solid analysis of a transition. Critical analysis must be 
ongoing in either case.  
Foundations may take note how bilateral aid agencies have become more sophisticated in this 
area, following hard lessons learned over six decades of development assistance. There is now a 
body of practice that, in addition to foundations’ own experiences, offers a helpful model. It cen-
tres on the use of country-level analytical tools (e.g., conflict assessments and power analyses) 
that involve extra layers of fact-checking and political assessment. These tools examine a country’s 
political history and institutions, as well as a broad range of obstacles, risks and entry points. The 
underlying ethos is self-evident: unrealistic expectations or faulty responses to political and social 
change are less likely when the analysis is mostly right. Given the complexity and time constraints 
in completing such an analysis, foundations have good reason to confer with larger, more experi-
enced aid agencies in order to exchange knowledge.  
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Methods of inquiry 
In transitions it is important to seek out information and entry points beyond the capitals or large 
cities and beyond the already-familiar international and local NGOs. This comes time and time 
again into the conversations and feedback from the groups we talk to on the ground. – Interview 
with foundation representative 
The moment of knowing everything about a context will never arrive. Risk-taking in transitional 
contexts necessarily implies action without complete knowledge. And it implies recourse to a prac-
tical set of tools and procedures for information-gathering and analysis that can help identify the 
true levers of change, pressure points and obstacles in the new environment.  
There are various ways to gather this information and develop high-quality analysis. A foundation 
can give the lead to its own field or headquarters-based staff. Alternatively, it can hire experienced 
external consultants or pool resources and conduct joint analysis with other donors through self-
organised efforts or foundation networks. The choice will vary by case, but the general default 
should be coordination and joint analyses unless there is a strong counter-argument. This is true 
for foundations considering first-time involvement in a country as well as those already operating 
there. Foundation networks, both regional and thematic, exist to serve this purpose. 
The case for pooled efforts is both normative and practical. First, local actors are already very busy 
on many fronts during transitions. It is not a good use of their time, and potentially very frustrating, 
to receive a continuous flow of meeting requests from different donors interested in asking near-
identical questions – a practice noted by grantees consistently across transitional environments. 
Secondly, donor collaboration helps to reduce the likelihood of duplication of work, as much of the 
basic information is usually already available in some form. Thirdly, cooperation at the information-
gathering stage can serve as a first step in building a network of like-minded donors that may 
become an invaluable long-term resource.  
The actual steps for gathering accurate information in a transitional context are mostly intuitive, 
yet rarely followed systematically:  
• Read the leading texts on the country’s history and politics. Doing so will, among other 
things, help in formulating better questions. 
• Read everything over 500 words written about the country in the last year in major 
independent news outlets. It will capture what people on the ground are thinking and  
give a sense of the prevailing common wisdom. 
• Use foundation networks to organise conference calls in which country experts provide 
briefings and answer questions about the state of play and key actors in the particular 
transition. 
• On any mission to the country, leave the capital and the main cities and venture into 
the country’s more remote regions. 
• Use existing networks and other tools, including social media, to seek out new contacts 
with original perspectives – knowing that, after speaking to at least 50 diverse informants 
(e.g., politicians, activists, military, journalists, civic and religious leaders, academics, and 
local foundations), it will be much harder to end up with a flawed analysis.  
Although these basic practices are all important, for foundations the exercise of gathering infor-
mation will always risk bias. Some interviewees, aware of the potential to receive funds, may be 
inclined to provide incomplete information or gear their remarks to what they presume the donor 
wants to hear. Triangulating sources and probing early findings can help to minimise this risk. For a 
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new donor unfamiliar with the context, though, there may be no adequate substitute to visiting 
the country and experiencing it first-hand.  
Foundation networks can play a key role here, as for example in Tunisia where two donor net-
works organised a four-day in-country learning programme for their members early in the transi-
tion. Networks can also play an information-sharing role through portals and affinity groups, 
so that a transition’s political and civic leaders do not end up the subject of dozens of separate, 
unpublished civil society mapping exercises. A jointly-planned mapping effort may be, in fact, the 
single most responsible information-gathering action foundations can undertake. 
Key questions 
Something that made sense today might not make sense tomorrow. In a transition, you need a  
system that has real-time evaluation and stocktaking of the different things that you are consider-
ing doing. – Interview with foundation leader 
Foundations are well-advised to draw on the tools developed by leading bilateral aid agencies as a 
guide in asking the questions that will lead to quality analysis. In general, the right questions centre 
on a limited number of themes, including:  
• shifts in the balance of power; 
• key obstacles to reform; 
• the comparative strength of formal and informal institutions; 
• emergent champions of reform; 
• the main dynamics and divisions in the society at large; 
• the security environment; and  
• key drivers of the real and informal economy.  
A good analysis, focused on these issues, can produce a nuanced picture of the local context. It 
may show, for example, the degree to which public opinion about the private sector, the army or 
another major sector could be expected to shift dramatically in the first period of a transition out 
of dictatorship; or the risk posed, in a post-conflict setting, of former combatants turning to pri-
vate crime and endangering a transition’s fragile stability; or, in either case, the principal factors 
favouring or undermining the underlying political settlement, without which the transition itself 
could be stillborn.  
Beyond these questions, in the initial stage of information-gathering private foundations will also 
need to examine – without any presumption of future activity – the degree to which cross-border 
grantmaking is practicable in the country. Counter to expectations a decade ago, obstacles to foreign 
funding are on the rise. Some countries continue to open their doors to cross-border funding (e.g., 
Tunisia and Burma), while others, once open, close theirs (e.g., Egypt and Russia). Understanding 
the local regulatory framework for cross-border grantmaking is essential, even if, in practice, 
foundations find creative ways of working alongside the rules to dispatch money or other forms of 
support to their chosen grantees. Seeking competent legal advice is always recommended.  
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Step 2: How relevant is our foundation’s mission and operating style to the new context?  
Risk appetites vary so you need to know the risk-aversion level within your foundation. In some 
cases, it is the living donor, even more than the staff, who sees a close fit with his or her foundation 
and is the one most ready to move when a transition begins, to try and take advantage of the  
moment. In other cases, the opposite is true: field-based personnel are excited about opportunities 
they clearly see, but headquarters puts on the brakes. – Interview with foundation leader  
Questions of fit 
Having gathered sufficient information and developed a robust analysis of the context, a foundation 
is ready to look inward and consider its own potential relevance to the transition. This involves 
assessing the degree of overlap between what external reality compels a foundation to consider 
(or reconsider) about the country, and what its mandate and capacities commit it to prioritise. 
In most cases there will be some degree of fit, and the foundation will need to determine if there 
is enough. It can be tempting to identify a fit where one does not truly exist. The emotional pull of 
witnessing a country break with years of war or repression can be so powerful that it may cloud 
otherwise sober judgment and lead to exaggerated interpretations of foundation mandates and 
capacities.  
Alternatively, foundation priorities that at first glance seem distant from a country’s new needs 
can, on deeper analysis, present an important opening. For example, reproductive health may not 
appear to be of urgent concern in the early months of a country’s transition, but the electoral pro-
gramme of a rising political force may include plans to restrict women’s access to family planning 
services. The reintegration of female former combatants may also not appear a priority in the 
early months of a tenuous power-sharing pact, but, if deferred, could threaten a country’s fragile 
social fabric. A foundation with a mandate and prior knowledge about either issue could have an 
important role to play in such contexts.  
Yet, even when a foundation’s mission has an objective overlap with the transitional context, 
internal rules and practices may present obstacles. Trustees who only meet once a year govern 
some foundations, slowing or preventing the ability to act. Some operate on the basis of multi-
year grants, making it difficult to adapt rapidly when the assumptions underlying those grants 
alter. Many foundations are restricted to supporting registered entities and may not immediately 
discern a way to support more informal actors or movements that are at the forefront of change 
but lack infrastructure and financial capacity. Other donors may lack field presence, which can 
affect their ability or willingness to enter an unfamiliar country in the midst of radical change. Still 
others may have field presence but not devolve authority for decision-making on grants. Shrinking 
endowments and programme budgets can also discourage boards from making new commitments 
that arise unexpectedly. 
If a foundation identifies an objective fit between its mission and the new context, however, it can 
often overcome these complications with long-term planning and a dose of creativity within exist-
ing systems.  
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Readiness to act 
Innovative responses can come in many forms when there is a readiness to act. For example, 
foundations restricted to working with registered entities have sometimes used local intermediar-
ies (e.g., university centres) with the experience and judgment to administer a programme of small 
grants to informal and emerging civic groups. Some large foundations called extraordinary meetings 
of their trustees to authorise special appropriations when the Arab Spring began. If the budget of a 
foundation’s country-specific programme is too small to respond to new opportunities, funds can 
also be loaned by another programme or drawn exceptionally from reserves. As the foundation 
sector’s experience with transitions broadens and deepens, more foundations are beginning to 
take these and other proactive steps – especially larger ones that cannot operate with the same 
flexibility and speed as small family foundations.  
Beyond these ad hoc solutions, foundations can also develop systemic approaches to respond to 
transitional opportunities:  
• First, foundation boards can consider developing a standing protocol or Transition Response 
Policy (TRP) that would function as an overarching policy for established thematic and 
regional programmes when periods of war and repressive rule end. It could save precious 
time in cases in which, for example, boards or management teams of a foundation meet 
infrequently. It could provide advance guidance to staff on how to gather data swiftly and 
answer the due diligence questions described above. Such a policy could incorporate risk-
taking and exploratory grantmaking as guiding principles, encouraging foundations to test, 
and where warranted support, new ideas and actors.  
• The natural counterpart to a TRP would be a Transitions Contingency Fund (TCF). Such a 
fund would be tapped only as needed in cases of unanticipated transitional openings, 
justified as a measure to increase preparedness. It could be linked to access to a foundation’s 
reserves, or be built separately and allowed to grow with an annual infusion from sources 
mandated by the trustees. Considerable authority for decision-making over the use of funds 
could be devolved to staff or advisers in the field. The TCF could have a designated focus on 
small grants, allowing time to test concepts and vet grantee organisations while larger grant 
portfolios are being considered.  
Although this TRP/TCF approach would not suit all foundations, it could help many avoid missed 
opportunities and ensure a smoother, more consistent internal method of assessment and response. 
Some of the larger aid agencies have already established thematic contingency policies with ear-
marked monies that are kept ready for unexpected major change. One bilateral agency, USAID, 
has gone a step further in establishing an Office of Transition Initiatives that is akin to a transition 
rapid-response unit within the larger organisation. In operation since 1994, it has the mandate and 
budget to provide “fast, flexible, short-term assistance” in response to windows of opportunity. 
Similar transition-related funds also exist at the multilateral level, including the UN Peacebuilding 
Fund and others at the World Bank.  
Step 3: What programmatic considerations arise when the priorities of our foundation  
overlap with the new context? 
When there is a clear alignment between transitional opportunities on the ground and a founda-
tion’s internal strengths and operating capacity, the review of potential programmatic strategies 
begins in earnest. Four overarching questions arise: Who and what will we fund? How long will we 
stay? How will we measure impact? What profile do we want to project? These always need to be 
asked and answered in a comprehensive way at the outset of grantmaking. In transitional settings, 
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though, wise donors will regularly reassess overall strategy and activities, perhaps as often as 
every six to eight weeks.  
Who and what will we fund? 
Transitions present opportunities for foundations to support ‘big things’, such as building new 
public institutions, enhancing the policy-generating capacity of civil society or nurturing new social 
and political norms. Opportunities of the same nature and magnitude do not arise in contexts of 
entrenched conflict or authoritarian rule. Transitions, accordingly, trigger a specific set of consid-
erations about target actors and projects. Foundations must consider at least four issues:  
• changing versus maintaining partners;  
• the balance of support between public entities and civil society; 
• the balance of support between local and international civil society; and 
• funder coordination. 
Changing versus maintaining partners  
A society is not a monolith. It also includes many populist and sectarian forces that are opposed to 
the values and ideals of a liberal democracy. To open societies up further during a transitional win-
dow, sometimes you need to be less against the government that is ruling them and more focused 
on transforming the conservatism and populism that is raging within the society. – Interview with 
transitions expert 
Transitions naturally spark profound changes in relationships. From families to workplaces, local 
communities to the national arena, old relationships experience rupture, distancing or new soli-
darity. A foundation with an existing set of grantees at the moment a transition begins needs to 
choose between renewing those relationships, perhaps with a different programmatic emphasis; 
striking out to find the next wave of change-makers; or some combination of the two.  
Choosing the right partners is always important but becomes even more crucial in the aftermath 
of war or repression, when civil society itself, often the bedrock of foundation grantmaking, is 
changing on multiple levels. Leading civil society members who were the object of early bets 
placed by clever donors prior to the transition may enter politics and become implementers of the 
reforms they designed during their days as dissidents; younger leaders may emerge, creating fric-
tion with an older generation of gatekeepers; and some of the best talent will be hired out of civil 
society into international agencies, including foundations. These are common phenomena. Foun-
dation grantmaking in a transition should be alert to these shifts, to avoid exacerbating foresee-
able negative consequences for local institution-building.  
Foundations are not bound to the funding of specific entities. Over time, they have determined 
that often they could help most by taking on the role of process-catalysers, serving as convenors 
for national actors and creating funding streams that incentivise collaboration on crucial policy issues, 
as the Hewlett Foundation did on government transparency and accountability during Mexico’s 
transition out of 70 years of one-party rule. Bilateral agencies often lack the legitimacy to take on 
this role, making it all the more important for foundations to fill the breach.  
Private philanthropy can play an especially powerful role as a catalyst or enabler of processes that 
foster inclusive political settlements. These are often the cornerstone of successful transitions – 
and difficult to achieve, as the Arab experience shows. Although foundations might be generally 
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averse to funding conferences, this is a situation when convening a well-timed meeting can have 
real impact. Activities that bring together divided or dispersed actors, as occurred before and 
during the transitions in South Africa and Northern Ireland, are often cited as success stories by 
donors. Such gatherings can take place inside the country (e.g., at a neutral university facility) or 
outside, if the situation requires. 
A process-oriented approach may also help address the increasingly ad hoc way that citizens 
organise themselves to press for change. This is one of the emerging challenges of responding to 
21st century transitions. In the past in Europe and the Americas, it was more common to encoun-
ter activists who were part of registered organisations with mature leadership and an identifiable 
social base. Today, informal groupings of youth, urban poor and non-unionised workers are sparking 
popular uprisings and reform movements. To help reach unregistered new partners like these who 
may better reflect a country’s transitional landscape, foundations need a creative grantmaking ap-
proach that could involve, for example, working through independent and trusted local institutions.  
Public entities versus civil society  
In Northern Ireland, the new government was initially reluctant to take on informal community  
policing units that were in some cases terrorising neighbourhoods. With local partners and a care-
fully-designed programme, we piloted an effort to shift the community groups to a monitoring role, 
with punishment left to local authorities. Despite initial resistance, the security services were later 
grateful for a model they could adopt and build upon. – Interview with foundation leader 
When new governments lack capacity, and civil society struggles to move from opposition to 
proposition, is it time to develop and act on a revised theory of change? In a transition, the state 
may no longer be the biggest enemy to reform movements, and civil society may no longer be the 
same driver of change. Many private foundations, nevertheless, struggle to gauge how far to 
move, if at all, in supporting the state-building enterprise, especially considering the comparatively 
small resources they have at their disposal in relation to the public sector’s total needs. There is 
also persistent fear of being seen as a political actor.  
Yet, the choice between support for governmental and non-governmental bodies may not be as 
stark as it seems. In transitional periods, a foundation can maintain a focus on civil society, but 
with a broader definition of the term. Civil society is not limited to NGOs. It includes think tanks, 
trade unions, universities, professional associations, cooperatives, religious bodies, cultural groups, 
social movements and charitable organisations, any number of which may rise in relevance and 
forge partnerships with state bodies. Government, too, requires a broader definition. Beyond the 
executive and legislative branches, it can include a wide range of institutional actors able to oper-
ate with varying degrees of independence, including citizen review boards and arm’s length agen-
cies such as anti-corruption commissions, ombudsman offices and human rights commissions. 
While making sure to respect prohibitions against donor support for political work as defined in 
U.S. and European charity laws, such bodies could warrant funding consideration by foundations 
when they are established early in a transition but lack basic capacity and start-up funds. Related 
opportunities can also arise when power is being devolved outward from the centre, as the people 
elected or appointed to positions in regional or local government typically have less experience 
and could benefit greatly from skills training and exposure to good governance principles.  
Transitions also tend to see an array of ad hoc, hybrid bodies comprised of both state and civil so-
ciety members and established by an interim or successor government. These include initiatives 
meant to play a transcendental role in support of the transition, such as constituent assemblies 
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responsible for developing a new constitution, truth commissions authorised to investigate a leg-
acy of mass abuse or special transitional steering committees, such as Tunisia’s High Commission 
for the Realisation of Revolutionary Objectives, Political Reforms and Democratic Transition estab-
lished in 2011. Foundations may, with modest funds, be able to boost the reach and impact of 
these vital bodies – a role that breaks down the traditional bifurcation between supporting state 
or civil society. In a transition, the right partners, and the spectrum of choices, look different than 
in other times or contexts.  
Local versus international civil society 
When you are in a dictatorship situation, international NGOs are useful in terms of amplifying  
the message on the international scene. They can also provide critical intelligence, helping to map 
the landscape and principal players. But in a transition, we believe that the focus and priority of  
our funding has to shift to local actors and their needs. – Interview with foundation director 
As offers of technical assistance and advice engulf local actors at the outset of a transition, local 
civil society often struggles to make sense of the influx and take full advantage of it. Key personnel 
may be recruited to work at higher salaries with international groups. International organisations 
may move in and compete with each other and with locals for new streams of funding. Duplicative 
calls for proposals by donors can drive duplicative activities, especially in terms of conferences 
and training. Before long, friction and tensions can arise between and among national and inter-
national NGOs.  
How should foundations anticipate and respond to these recurrent syndromes through their cross-
border grantmaking? Best practice suggests they should treat transitions as periods when the 
international role loses centrality to the national voice, which is suddenly no longer tightly controlled 
by the state or caught in the grip of war. Although international civil society actors can contribute 
important and specialised technical advice in the early period of a transition, overall patterns of 
involvement reflect an over-supply of expert assistance, a limited customisation to context and a 
lack of outreach and access to key groups outside the main cities – patterns to which an uncoordi-
nated foundation sector has frequently contributed. 
These patterns can be minimised through creative grantmaking. Beyond greater donor coordina-
tion, foundations can design their programmes to harness the international role without prioritis-
ing it. Institutional partnerships between locals and internationals can be fostered through calls for 
joint proposals that are structured to facilitate the transfer of skills and responsibilities, for exam-
ple by having a four-year grant agreement in which the international is the formal grantee in the 
first two years and the local is the grantee in the last two. Drawing on their particular strengths, 
internationals could also be hired for more targeted tasks, such as to conduct early and quick-
impact research or actor mapping that fills initial knowledge gaps. In general, though, local actors, 
as the primary agents of change, need to have the largest say in identifying the type and quantity 
of international civil society support they require.  
Related issues arise when diaspora groups want to play a role in the transition phase. Sometimes 
they bridge the gap between national and international expertise effectively. In other instances, 
though, they lack credibility or up-to-date knowledge of conditions on the ground. In Libya, some 
diaspora groups are filling large gaps in gender programmes and service delivery that cannot be 
managed by those who lived under authoritarian rule for decades. Even then, however, their mo-
tives may be called into question by locals who experienced the hardship of the years before the 
transition.  
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Funder coordination  
If you intervene in a particular place today, especially a mediatised transition, the spotlight is more 
intensive, which can have the consequence of making donors risk-averse. But by the same token, 
the increased accessibility and visibility of information about what each donor is doing could – and 
should – create a greater incentive for coordinated action and joint mobilisation. The problem is 
that even though foundations can easily find out what others are doing, they often have little inter-
est in doing so. The problem of weak coordination is more one of will, and less one of capacity.  
– Interview with foundation director 
Donor coordination is nearly always a virtue, but it is all the more so in the heady setting of a tran-
sition out of armed conflict or authoritarian rule. When full cooperation works, it can amplify the 
impact of each entity involved. During the early stages of transitions in the former Yugoslavia and 
Tunisia, for example, deliberate efforts to pool funds led to important collaboration. Donors made 
funds available to advance the European Union integration processes in the former case and for 
locally-determined capacity-building projects in an economically-marginalised region in the latter. 
Beyond its direct benefits, donor collaboration of this sort also helps to diminish the risk, so often 
present in a transition, of the cultivation of an artificially large and unsustainable NGO sector.  
Coordination in practice requires a proactive effort to stay aware of other foundations’ activities. 
Good grantmaking will proceed from a thorough prior scan of what is currently funded or planned 
and can encompass basic exchanges of information about a transitioning country, meetings to dis-
cuss future plans with other foundations and organised divisions of labour for sector-specific inter-
ventions (e.g., on rule of law, security or women’s rights). The simple rule should be to coordinate 
early and often. Donor associations in Europe and North America already make this possible, offering 
the tools to meet easily and cheaply across borders.  
In the right circumstances, foundations can go beyond coordination within their own sector. They 
can attempt to catalyse it with other donors and investors, including like-minded foreign minis-
tries, multilateral aid agencies and the private sector. At present, this is rarely done, although the 
OECD and UNDP increasingly engage in the interface between private philanthropy and other aid 
and development sectors.  
Going further still, coordination could itself become a foundation niche in contexts of transition, 
providing another rewarding way in which to play an acupunctural role. For example, in areas of 
policy priority for the country in question, foundations could fund a coordinator to maintain a web 
platform to support continuous information exchange about key funding opportunities, events, 
training courses and research during the first years of a transition. The annual cost of establishing 
this would be a fraction of the cost of a single hotel conference, and the benefits in terms of efficiency 
and transparency could be immense.  
How long will we stay? 
The duration of a foundation’s involvement in a country transitioning out of war or dictatorship 
is intricately tied to the prior question of whom and what to fund. A foundation must consider, at 
a minimum, the approximate number of years it will engage and, along with that, the potential 
complementary role of local philanthropy. 
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The long and short 
I would plead for multi-year investment in key organisations. Build their capacity and essentially 
think about how you do that over the long term, as opposed to just being involved in the glamour  
of the moment. There has to be an effort to leave behind a sustainable infrastructure. – Interview 
with foundation director 
Experience underscores the importance of informing grantees, from the start, of the expected 
duration of a grantmaking programme. Every foundation will naturally have its own appetite for 
how long to stay the course in a particular case, but usually less than four years is too short and 
five to ten years is ideal. A new donor, in particular, may require many months just to conduct initial 
analysis, find partners and begin to implement programmes. And unlike aid agencies, foundations 
do not have the luxury of guaranteed continuity in the form of an embassy that will remain engaged 
long after any transitional aid mechanism winds down. The importance of a responsible entry and 
exit is, in this respect, greater for foundations. 
Ideally, foundation grantmakers will invest both heavily in the short term and incrementally over 
the longer term. As transitions are rare windows of opportunity for political, economic and socio-
cultural transformation, quick catalytic injections of funding, even in small amounts, can jump-
start desired changes. At the same time, experienced foundations know that some changes in a 
society, even if facilitated by the early period of transition, will not be completed for a decade or 
more. Accordingly, donors with the resources and ability to see these changes through to fruition 
have reason to do so. They have time to build an internal learning and adaptation component into 
their programmes and can commit to be experimental and flexible upfront, so that the longer-
term investments build upon lessons learned along the way.  
For foundations that plan to be present for a shorter period (e.g., four to five years), partnership 
development with donors able to stay longer and with local entities is advisable. Shorter-stay 
donors may also consider experimenting with social investment strategies in which they support 
emerging local social entrepreneurs. They establish businesses to address a public need, such as 
health services or energy production, and if successful become self-sustaining within a few years. 
This method is proving popular with young change-agents in North Africa who believe they can 
achieve greater social impact through entrepreneurship than standard civil society or public sector 
approaches. Foundations that do not plan to stay beyond a few years may alternatively think 
about focusing their support on the equivalent of the UN’s Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) – an 
approach calibrated to the speed of change in the initial stages of a transition. QIPs are low-cost, 
small projects that aim to build confidence in early stages of peace-building.  
Regardless of the approach, foundations experienced in transitional contexts should plan their 
strategies based on foreseeable patterns of overall funding streams. The first few years of a transi-
tion often coincide with an intensification of investment from multilateral and bilateral agencies, 
as occurred in post-conflict transitions in West and Central Africa. Four to five years out, much of 
that money will have begun to dry up. From day one, therefore, responsible foundations can work 
with grantees to help prepare them for this predictable, often-destabilising ebb and flow. Founda-
tions can also assist long-term grantees in the final years of a relationship with financial planning 
and the search for alternative donors.  
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Connecting with local philanthropy  
Our foundation has as a core mission to strengthen local forms of philanthropic giving. This encour-
ages a broad engagement with transitioning countries around the world where private giving had 
been previously underdeveloped. The strategy is simple and avoids the dangers of encouraging local 
NGOs to become dependent on foreign assistance. Its application varies greatly from country to 
country, but over the years we have found that the community foundation model is one particularly 
well-suited to societies in transition. It provides technical support as well as small start-up grants  
to enable under-served groups to organise and generate local resources for their communities.  
It allows excluded groups to begin to take charge of their own inclusion in the transition process.  
– Interview with a cross-border foundation director 
Cross-border grantmakers may face a number of foreseeable practical challenges when supporting 
societies in transition. These include regulatory frameworks and legitimacy gaps, as well as limited 
context knowledge and finite programming periods. Partnerships with local philanthropy can be 
vital to overcoming these challenges. Cross-border donors can benefit from accumulated wisdom 
about local realities, reduce exposure as an outsider and ensure responsible exits, inasmuch as they 
boost prospects of programme sustainability. Foreign foundations are rightly drawn into transitions 
abroad when they arise; but unlike local foundations, few will choose to create a permanent base 
in the country.  
In many transitional contexts, the capacity of local philanthropy may be limited due to years of 
operating within an inhospitable environment. Basic foundation practices such as transparent 
grantmaking may not yet exist. Local foundations, if created by wealthy expatriates from the dias-
pora, may be as suspect as foreign donors. In an extreme case, Libya, the state did not allow a 
single foundation or civil society organisation to exist except those associated with the Gaddafi 
family. Yet even in less extreme cases, finding local donors with sufficient grantmaking capacity, 
as well as shared objectives, can be challenging. Building partnerships and trust tends to be a long-
term and gradual process. To start, small pilot collaborations over a common transitional interest 
can test the ground for future joint programming.  
A more forceful option exists, however. In the early years of transition in places such as Southern 
Africa, Central Europe and the former Yugoslavia, a group of international foundations made support 
for local philanthropic infrastructure (including philanthropy centres and membership associations) 
the central element of grantmaking. In the best cases, such a strategy combines the comparative 
strengths of large foreign foundations, including experience with different models and practices of 
professional philanthropy, with the intrinsic strengths of local foundations, including durability of 
commitment and depth of contextual understanding. The foundations’ sensible postulate was that 
until indigenous channels of funding are in place and at scale, transitioning countries will remain 
dependent on international aid.  
How will we measure impact? 
There is a powerful pressure on public money to be controlled by results frameworks, quantitative 
indicators and stringent accountability devices. All of these undermine rather than foster the flexibil-
ity you need in a transition. But foundation money is not taxpayer money, and so, theoretically at 
least, it is much more flexible. A wealthy private philanthropist can reach into his wallet and hand 
over five million dollars to somebody over lunch and say "go have a good time”. And that is why it is 
disappointing to see so many private foundations undermine their flexibility advantage, by mimick-
ing the worst measurement practices of public agencies. – Interview with transitions expert 
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The foundation sector has moved in recent years toward greater expectations of accountability for 
the use of grant funds. Grantees are expected to systematically measure the impact of their work, 
and foundation officers are under similar pressures from their leadership and boards. Greater 
rigor in performance assessment is naturally welcome. Yet, transition outcomes – and political 
change processes more generally – are particularly unsuited to such quantification. These meas-
ures, if applied rigidly, risk suffocating the innovation and flexibility that make politically-attuned 
grantmaking possible in the first place.  
Presently, ‘impact’ is the main watchword of the field. However, that may be the wrong thing to 
try to measure in a transition. It is by definition a longer-term macro-goal (e.g., in the nature of 
preventing future conflict), for which any donor or grantee can only ever take partial credit. A sys-
tem that attempts to monitor and evaluate ‘progress against intended outcomes’ (e.g., increasing 
stakeholder interactions or changing the terms of a public debate) is a more practical and honest 
measure. Likewise, it is difficult for any donor or grantee to make persuasive attribution claims 
regarding the cause of specific results within the policy change process. There are simply too many 
contextual variables and too many actors involved. Focusing on ‘contribution’, rather than seeking 
to attribute a specific outcome to one’s efforts alone, is more reliable and accurate. 
The reality is that it is intrinsically more difficult to measure many of the things that count most in 
transitions, such as democratic culture or improved well-being, than it is to measure the impact of 
ventures such as vaccination drives. A foundation that is too rigid in measuring outcomes in periods 
of transition risks unnecessarily replicating the practices of bilateral donors, who envy the com-
parative independence and flexibility of private philanthropy decision-making. Rigid quantitative 
metrics can also produce the unintended effect of increasing competition among grantees, incen-
tivising them to exaggerate the results of their work and claim excessive credit.  
What transitions most need, in fact, is for foundations to coordinate among themselves, learning 
from each other’s successes and failures, to boost experimentation and flexibility. While some 
foundations are moving toward more internal discussion of failed projects, this appears to be the 
last frontier for inter-foundation sharing. Few publish detailed evaluations of the outcomes of the 
risks they have taken in transitional contexts, even though there is a wealth of valuable lessons that 
could inspire other foundations to better define and measure what matters most when a country 
passes out of conflict or authoritarian rule. The two clear points of consensus for now are that in 
transitions it is important, first, to evaluate more frequently, and secondly, to view evaluation as a 
device to create feedback loops on the potential utility of mid-course programme adjustments. 
What profile will we have? 
What I saw in Burma was a gold rush of assistance: lots of big actors moving in with hundreds of 
millions of dollars, but extremely low capacity on the Burmese side to absorb the assistance. Now if 
you are a private actor, the tendency is to say: “I want to carve out my own thing that I’m good at”. 
If one advised that donor: “Look, the Norwegian government is about to put $2.5 billion of assis-
tance into this country; could you conceive of taking a strategic role as a lever to make sure this 
money is better spent?” In general, foundations would say “no”, since they would rather have their 
own grantees and get credit for their own programmes. Being a lever is not as strategically pleasing 
or high profile, but it could make a big difference for the Burmese transition. – Interview with  
transitions expert  
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The largest and oldest private foundations have a substantial track record of cross-border grant-
making in support of transitions, but not a high-profile one. Some have been content to support 
actors and projects for years without seeking attention for their contribution, beyond a basic 
acknowledgment of support in grantee materials and publications. These choices are made freely 
and selflessly at times. In other cases, such as volatile security environments, the absence of high 
profile is a necessity more than a choice. In such circumstances, foundations may make grants 
through trusted intermediaries or re-granting schemes, or simply by operating quietly behind the 
scenes. This can be problematic for a foundation committed to transparency, but exceptional cir-
cumstances may justify it.  
At the opposite end of the spectrum, there may be good arguments for a foundation to decide 
that public communication should form a major aspect of its programming strategy. It may wish to 
use its knowledge of the intricacies of a transitional situation to engage in public education in its 
home country. It may use field presence to disseminate original information and analysis about a 
pending humanitarian crisis. Taking advantage of its institutional independence and legitimacy, 
a foundation may even choose to make its voice heard within the transitioning country, for exam-
ple by writing or speaking publicly when a grantee is harassed by interim authorities angered by its 
work to expose corruption. Although speaking out in this way could potentially harm a foundation’s 
freedom and flexibility in a country, following consultations with local partners, it may sometimes 
be necessary.  
There is a long tradition, however, of working behind the scenes – as so many foundations have 
done in transitions from Brazil to Russia and Egypt. Although this may conflict with general demands 
for increased transparency and accountability, it may be demanded by the realities of engagement 
in politically-sensitive situations. NGOs and donors in Syria are consciously deciding to work in this 
way to address the immense humanitarian crisis caused by the war there. Yet, regardless of a 
foundation’s public stance regarding communication, it should maintain close contact with local 
actors and other foundation donors in the country. 
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Conclusion: An Ongoing Conversation 
I convinced my board to get involved right after the Mubarak regime fell, when there were so  
many new problems to be tackled. We are part of the community and therefore have to be part  
of the change. – Interview with a local corporate foundation director  
The grantmaking framework presented here comprises two simple propositions: first, that by their 
nature transitions are an opportunity for international and local donors to achieve disproportion-
ate political, economic and socio-cultural outcomes; and secondly, that foundations have a com-
parative advantage in relation to such historical moments that should be seized. Local government 
investments are often frozen or contested in transitions, while bilateral and other aid is frequently 
conditioned, slow to be allocated or inaccessible to unconventional actors. Given their compara-
tive flexibility and speed, private foundations can make targeted interventions with relatively small 
amounts of money that can result in potentially large rewards. They can marshal seasoned talent 
and diverse in-house expertise in responding to transitional challenges. With their relative inde-
pendence and legitimacy, foundations also have more latitude to be experimental and catalytic in 
their funding priorities.  
Many, nevertheless, fear making decisions that could exacerbate challenging situations on the 
ground. ‘Failed’ philanthropic interventions in past transitions in places such as Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Guatemala and Somalia have led some to a wait-and-see approach rather than a proactive one. 
Such a cautionary impulse is understandable, but it is important to keep the negative examples in 
context. There are scores of cases in which private philanthropy is associated with transformative 
change in transitional moments, from Eastern Europe to West Africa, and from South America to 
South Asia. To bring these and other stories to the surface, and the lessons they offer, ongoing 
conversation is needed. This guide is intended as a first step in that direction.  
The creation of a donor network or affinity group focused specifically on post-authoritarian and 
post-conflict transitions could be a further step. It could be established through existing thematic 
and regional networks or as a stand-alone initiative. Once in place, the group could serve as a plat-
form for sharing information, analysis and experience, and encouraging collaboration on a country-
by-country basis as transitional opportunities arise. Under the leadership of foundations with sub-
stantial field presence and track records in transitions, it could also help promote evaluation of the 
sector’s successes and failures. A transition affinity group of this sort could likewise serve as a forum 
for day-after transitional planning for countries on the verge of conflict termination or democratic 
restoration. In parallel, the group could develop a set of transition-focused voluntary principles to 
guide and strengthen future grantmaking.  
The disproportionate outcome opportunities are manifestly available for private foundations 
interested in transitions. With a few practical steps, the sector could set itself a more focused 
agenda in order to leverage its natural advantages and better respond to these unique historical 
openings. In so doing, foundations might profoundly assist these societies as they seek to establish 
the political, economic and social conditions to prevent a relapse into mass violence or repression. 
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ANNEX 1 
Ten “Do’s” of Foundation Grantmaking in Transitional Contexts 
1. Respond in real time 
Things happen fast, and as an Egyptian related to me at a meeting in Brussels, an EU official had 
said to them that their “revolution fell at the wrong time in our two-year budget cycle”. By contrast, 
the head of the Middle East programme of this foundation went to a Board meeting with a  
$5 million budget, and the board gave him $50 million and said “allocate it by next month”. Speed is 
significant. Having the ability to move quickly is remarkable. – Interview with transition expert 
2. Raise your risk tolerance 
The big problem is the way that many foundations think about giving money to people. My analogy 
would be that these are innovation investments in times of transition, and you should think about 
grant funding as risk capital investments. You should expect half of your money to fail, a quarter to 
just tip over and do something, and a quarter to really take off and succeed. If I was working for 
dead people, I would regard failure as a necessary price of success. But I don’t think many founda-
tions think in that way. – Interview with foundation trustee 
3. Look outside before looking inside 
Are you about your own values or are you looking at what that society needs in order to move for-
ward? That is a fundamental confusion, I think, in the eyes of many foundations, because they think 
they are doing work for other people. They don’t often reflect on the ways in which their own priori-
ties are shaping the intervention, and not the other way around. They are not necessarily reflecting 
on whether a particular intervention is what that society as a whole needs when it is in the middle 
of changing …. Foundations can definitely help promote universal values that are absent in societies 
emerging out of the abyss. But they still need to focus first on what the society itself needs.  
– Interview with foundation trustee 
4. Think politically 
Transitions are, by definition, periods of political change. And perhaps this explains some of the reti-
cence of foundations. Is there a way to be political in your actions without being seen as political? 
Philanthropy feels it always needs to be apolitical. But in fact we need to be more political, not less, 
especially in how we analyse the situation on the ground when a transition is underway. All areas of 
change, from trade policy to employment to health and education, involve political dimensions and 
political choices – whether we admit it or not. – Roundtable comment 
5. Leverage your strengths as a sector 
Foundations have so many advantages. Nobody in government stays in a position for a long time, 
so you have a constant reinvention of the wheel and re-learning of the curve, and it’s devastating to 
public actors. In private foundations, personnel may stay for 15 years. This has a flipside, of course, 
if they’re not good, but on the whole it is better. Related to that is greater flexibility to hire person-
nel. It would be hard for some bilaterals in Cairo to hire Egyptian personnel, but Ford can do that. 
Also, if you join the foreign ministry, you have to have a standard set of qualifications. Maybe what 
you really need is a local process-oriented person who may not have that other experience, but you 
can target a grassroots organiser who would never pass a civil service exam, and she’s the right 
person. – Interview with transition expert 
 Supporting Countries in Transition | 33 
6. Coordinate early and often 
There are a lot more philanthropic structures like Ariadne and Arab Foundations Forum that are  
beginning to play a role in convening and urging people to talk to one another before they rush in. 
Funders are more aware that this emerging infrastructure is good for learning about what is hap-
pening on the ground. Donor networks should be the first port of call in many cases. These can also 
be a good place to begin to explore options for pooled resources and donor coalitions, which give 
everyone greater legitimacy. –Interview with foundation representative  
7. Look beyond civil society 
There was an eye-opener experience I had in the Balkans, where I would visit on the same day, in a 
town of about 80,000 inhabitants, a big NGO which was the country’s largest, with a staff of 25, 
each with laptops, and the director was being driven around in a limousine with a driver. On the 
same day I would visit the mayor of this town and he had only one computer for his whole office 
and had to drive himself. It changed my perspective. If we as foundations don’t take the risk to work 
with public actors, then who is going to do this? From then on, we tried as much as possible to build 
this culture of cooperation between civil society and public actors in transitional contexts. It has 
been an important feature of our work. The goal is no longer to strengthen civil society as such, but 
to work with them and to build this culture of cooperation with the government and public actors. 
We think that it is extremely important for sustainability of the programmes we have. – Interview 
with foundation leader 
8. Exercise the freedom to measure flexibly 
I envy colleagues who can simply measure mortality rates and tie them to disease or shelter avail-
ability, whereas there are so many variables in the realm in which we work. Anyone in our space 
needs to grapple with the fact that no matter how much energy you put into measuring impact, you 
may never be able to precisely say what that impact is. Transitions require a different kind of metric. 
– Interview with aid agency leader 
9. Embrace the failures 
There is a lot of talk in the foundation world about accepting and learning from failure. Yet, it is 
hard to find donors brave enough to publish evaluations of their unsuccessful grants, even though 
this might push forward the field. I heard of one U.S. donor that circulates an internal award for the 
‘worst grant’ close-out memo every month. If we could encourage wider sharing and seriousness 
about learning from failure, I think we could move ahead much faster when it comes to our work  
in transitional societies. – Comment in a roundtable discussion  
10. Support processes that increase inclusiveness 
What you really needed in Egypt in the first six months was a much bigger dialogue process and 
easing off on rushing to elections, and instead having negotiations. Whether outsiders could have 
helped make that happen is a question, but that hasn’t been a big part of the transition paradigm. 
Assistance has been focused on elections, new constitutions and so forth. These look like the build-
ing blocks, but these building blocks have been undermined by the lack of a more central building 
block: an inclusive political settlement. And the problem with that building block is that it is not  
very amenable to technical assistance. – Interview with transitions expert 
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for which IFIT and the Gerhart Center express their gratitude, noting in particular the thoughtful 
contributions of Regional Representative Noha El-Mikawy. 
Quotations that appear throughout the guide are identified by category of respondent, rather 
than attributed by name. They were chosen as reflections of the most prominent recurring themes 
in the interviews and consultations.  
The names of all those who contributed to this publication through interviews, consultations and 
feedback are posted here. A list of suggested additional readings on the subject of philanthropy 
and transitions, which will be updated periodically, is posted in the same location. 
An Arabic translation of this publication, which will include additional material on foundation 
engagement in the context of the Arab transitions, will be made available on the websites of the 
Gerhart Center and IFIT. 
 
 The full English version of this report may be accessed online at http://goo.gl/prZ6ow 
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